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Abstract: 
Paul  Ricœur  shared  Emmanuel  Mounier’s  personalist  and  communitarian  ideal  of  a  universal  community,  
which   ensures   that   every   human   being   has   access   to   the   conditions   for   self-­‐‑development   as   a   person.  
Whereas  Mounier  talks  about  communication  as  the  structure  of  personhood  that  summons  us  towards  the  
gradual   enlargement   of   the   community,   Ricœur’s   reflections   on   translation   provide   a   missing   link   by  
referring,  not  just  to  the  human  capacity  to  communicate,  but  more  specifically,  to  our  capacity  to  translate  
and  the  implied  ethics  of  linguistic  hospitality.  This  allowed  him  to  show  that  what  enables  us  to  enlarge  the  
circle  of  brotherhood  is  the  capacity  to  gradually  settle  in  the  world  of  the  other  and  to  welcome  the  other  
into  one’s  own  world.  
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Résumé: 
Paul  Ricœur  partageait   l’idéal   personnaliste   et   communautaire  d’Emmanuel  Mounier  d’une   communauté  
universelle   assurant   à   chaque   être   humain   les   conditions   pour   la   développement   de   soi-­‐‑même   comme  
personne.   Tandis   que  Mounier   parlait   de   la   communication   comme   la   structure   de   la   personne   qui   nous  
appelle  vers  l’élargissement  graduel  de  la  communauté,  les  réflexions  de  Ricœur  sur  la  traduction  ont  fourni  
le   chaînon   manquant   en   faisant   référence   pas   seulement   à   la   capacité   de   communiquer,   mais   plus  
précisément  à  la  capacité  de  traduire  et  l’éthique  de  l’hospitalité  langagière.  Cela  l’a  permis  d’indiquer  que  
ce   qui   nous   permet,   en   dépit   de   toute   étrangeté,   d’élargir   le   cercle   de   la   fraternité   est   la   capacité   de   se  
transporter  dans  la  sphère  de  l’autre  et  d’accueillir  l’autre  chez  soi.  
Mots-­‐‑clés:  Ricœur,  Mounier,  traduction,  éthique,  communauté.  
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Paul   Ricœur   was   deeply   influenced   by   the   charismatic   public   intellectual   Emmanuel  
Mounier   (1905-­‐‑1950),   the   founder   of   the   journal   Esprit   and   leader   of   the   French   personalist  
movement.1   Mounier   described   the   ambition   of   the   personalists   as   the   “remaking   of   the  
renaissance”  towards  a  universal  “personalist  and  communitarian  civilization”  that  enables  every  
person   to   live   her   life   to   the   fullest.2   In   this   article,   we   will   see   how   Ricœur’s   reflections   on  
translation   can   be   read   as   both   a   continuation   of   as  well   as   an   improvement   upon  Mounier’s  
work.  
The  Universal  Unity  of  Persons  
French   personalism   stood   as   a   plea   to   uphold   the   dignity   of   the   person   against   the  
threatening  ideologies  of  the  time.  Mounier  believed  that  restoring  respect  for  the  dignity  of  the  
human   person   would   require   nothing   less   than   a   social   revolution   that   would   bring   about   a  
personalist   and   communitarian   civilization.   Such   a   civilization   would   enable   everyone   to   live  
their   lives   to   the   fullest   and   to   recognize   natural   communities   in   their   own  purpose,   although  
these  communities  would  also  have  to  be  directed  towards  the  full  development  of  every  person.  
Mounier  described  personhood  as  follows:    
A   person   is   a   spiritual   being   constituted   as   such   by   a   way   of   subsistence   and   of  
independence   in   his   being;   he   maintains   this   subsistence   by   his   adhesion   to   a   freely  
adopted,  assimilated  and  lived  hierarchy  of  values,  by  means  of  responsible  commitment  
and   constant   conversion;   hence,   he   unifies   all   of   his   actions   in   freedom   and,  moreover,  
develops  the  singularity  of  his  vocation  on  the  basis  of  creative  actions.3    
In   his  Manifeste   au   service   du   personnalisme   (1936),   Mounier   described   the   institutional  
preconditions   for   making   personhood   possible   in   several   domains,   such   as   the   economic,   the  
political,   the   educational,   and   the   cultural.   However,   he   emphasized   that   his   proposed   social  
revolution  was  not  restricted  to  the  nation-­‐‑state.  In  fact,  the  nation-­‐‑state  was  considered  to  be  an  
outdated   concept   from   the   personalist   point   of   view.   If   the   person   is   the   primary   political  
concern,  then  our  political  responsibility  is  not  bound  by  state  borders:    
There  is  no  foreign  policy  for  personalism:  neither  national  politics  that  would  play  its  own  
game,  using  persons  and  communities   that  constitute   the  nation   for   its  own  benefit;  nor  
international   politics   that   would   impose   itself   on   existing   states   as   an   impersonal   rule,  
voluntarily  ignorant  about  their  content.4    
Mounier   considered   the   task   implied   here   to   be   in   line  with   the   essential   structure   of  
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the   existence   of   others   expresses   itself   politically   in   the   task   of   creating   a   society   where   all  
institutions   and   traditions   are   permeated   by   this   understanding   of   the   nature   of   the   person.  
Mounier   explicitly   linked   the   commitment   to   this   task   with   a   continuing   openness   towards  
mankind  as  a  whole.  Hence,  he  described  a  fundamental  tension  in  personalism.  This  tension  “is  
constituted  by  a  double  movement,  apparently  contradictory,  but  in  fact  dialectical,  towards  the  
affirmation   of   personal   absolutes   that   resist   all   reduction,   and   towards   the   construction   of   a  
universal  unity  of  the  world  of  persons.”6  In  other  words,  personalism  constantly  strives  not  only  
to  create  better  services,  but  to  affect  an  increasingly  greater  number  of  persons  as  well.  This  task  
is  the  responsibility  of  every  human  being.  It  is  the  communicative  structure  of  personhood  that  
allows   us   to   assume   this   responsibility.   Mounier   indicated   that   upholding   the   dignity   of   the  
person  is  cumulative  and  takes  place  specifically  over  the  course  of  five  steps:  1)  by  continuously  
approaching  the  other,  2)  by  developing  an  understanding  of  another’s  point  of  view,  3)  through  
empathy  and,  4)  generosity,  and  the  final  and  hardest  part,  5)  by  remaining  loyal  to  this  acquired  
sense  of  community.7  The  scope  of  this  undertaking  was  no  less  than  “the  movement  towards  the  
unification  of  the  personal  universe”.8  
Paul  Ricœur  held  Mounier’s   ideal  of   a  personalist   and  communitarian   civilization  very  
dearly.  This  is  most  evident  in  his  reflections  on  moral  theology.  In  his  famous  essay  Le  socius  et  le  
prochain   (1954),   Ricœur   stressed   that   the   love   of   one’s   neighbor   not   only   has   an   interpersonal  
meaning,  but  also  an  institutional  dimension.  He  went  on  to  argue  that  this  duality  implies  that  
the  love  of  one’s  neighbor  exerts  a  two-­‐‑sided  critical  pressure  on  the  social  bond:    
In   comparison   to   love   of   neighbor,   the   social   bond   is   never   as   profound   or   as  
comprehensive.   It   is  never  as  profound  because  social  mediations  will  never  become  the  
equivalent  of  encounter  or  immediate  presence.  It  is  never  as  comprehensive  because  the  
group  only  asserts  itself  against  another  group  and  shuts  itself  off  from  others.9    
The   same   concern   defined   his   political   philosophy.   In   his   reflections   on   the   ethics   of  
citizenship,  Ricœur  emphasized  the  need  for  a  dialectical   tension  between  an  ethics  of   conviction  
and   an   ethics   of   responsibility.   Civic   virtue   is   not   a   matter   of   espousing   an   absolute   ethics   of  
conviction  that  blindly  follows  an  ideal  without  consideration  of  the  consequences  of  the  exercise  
of   power   in   the   real  world.  An   ethics   of   conviction  has   to   be   counter-­‐‑balanced  by   an   ethics   of  
responsibility,  which   stands   for   reasonable,   prudent   political   action   and  which   is   aware   of   the  
dangers   of   the  paradoxical   nature   of   power,  without   ever   losing   sight   of   the   ideal.10  However,  
even  if  the  political  paradox  forces  us  into  an  ethics  of  responsibility,  this  should  never  detach  us  
from  the  ethical   ideals   that  are  meant   to  ground  our  political  actions.  What   is   important   for  us  
now   is   that   Ricœur   identified   these   ideals   while   making   explicit   reference   to   Emmanuel  
Mounier’s   idea   of   a   personalist   and   communitarian   utopia,   that   is   the   idea   of   a   universal  
community   that   allows   every  human  being   to  develop   into   a   complete  person.11   The  universal  
dimension   of   this   aspiration   remained   present   in  Ricœur’s   later   political   thought.   In  Oneself   as  
Another   (1992),   he   wrote   about   the   concern   for   the   common   good,   not   as   a   given,   but   as  
something  that  needs  to  be  formulated  step  by  step  in  an  endless  dialogue  that  requires  the  active  
participation   of   every   individual.   This   dialogue   is   what   constitutes   practical   wisdom   in   the  
institutional  domain.  Ricœur  emphasized  the  fact  that  this  project  of  fostering  the  common  good  
requires   a  maximal   recognition   of   both   contextualism   and   universalism,   in   order   to   be   able   to  
arrive  at  well-­‐‑considered  convictions.  The  task,  then,  is  to  develop  a  social  creativity  that  allows  
Communication,  Translation  and  the  Global  Community  of  Persons  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  6,  No  1  (2015)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2015.277        http://ricoeur.pitt.edu    
48  
  
us  to  work  together  on  the  basis  of  diverse  historical  and  traditional  sources.  Hence,  we  have  to  
cherish  our   roots,  without   letting   those   roots  weigh  us  down.12  However,  Ricœur  did  not   only  
consider  this  task  in  light  of  the  common  good  within  a  given  community.  The  task  also  concerns  
the   extension   of   the   community,   in   light   of   the   never   ending   enlargement   of   the   circle   of  
recognition.13  
The  Paradigm  of  Translation  
The  ethics  of  the  enlargement  of  the  political  community  is  an  important  framework  for  
understanding  Ricœur’s  reflections  on  translation,  for  it  is  the  so-­‐‑called  “paradigm  of  translation”  
that  he  identified  as  the  model  for  this  enlargement  project.14  The  first  principle  of  this  paradigm  
is  the  plurality  of  languages,  in  contrast  with  the  universality  of  linguistic  competence.  Everyone  
speaks,  but  there  are  thousands  of  different  languages  in  the  world.  The  second  principle  is  the  
fact  of  translation.  Man  has  always  produced  translations,  which  implies  that  he  has  the  ability  to  
learn   and   to   use   a   language   other   than   his   own.15   If   languages   were   radically   heterogeneous,  
translation  would   be   theoretically   impossible.   The   opposite   hypothesis,   namely   that   there   is   a  
common  basis  to  all  languages  in  the  sense  of  an  original  or  implicit  universal  language,  is  no  less  
problematic.  However,  despite  these  theoretical  difficulties,  we  do  translate  in  practice:  “Yes,  we  
need   to   confess,   from   one   language   to   the   next,   the   situation   is   indeed   one   of   dispersion   and  
confusion.  And  yet  translation  is  part  of  a  long  litany  of  ‘in  spite  of  all  that.’  In  spite  of  fratricide,  
we  campaign  for  universal  fraternity.  In  spite  of  the  heterogeneity  of  idioms,  there  are  bilingual,  
polyglot   people,   interpreters   and   translators.”16   Based   on   this   finding,   Ricœur   characterized  
translation  as  a  task.  It  is  obviously  a  task  for  the  purposes  of  utility,  often  from  the  simple  need  
to  get  something  done,  but  for  things  as  complex  as  trade  or  war  as  well.  He  referred,  however,  to  
a   deeper   dimension   of   the   task   of   translation,   namely   “the   desire   to   translate,”   a   desire   that  
relates   to  Bildung  and   the  broadening  of  one’s  own  horizon.  Ricœur  emphasized   the   important  
fact  that  the  task  of  translation  is  double.  The  translator  has  to  restate  something  that  was  stated  
elsewhere,   in   a   different   linguistic   and   cultural   context,   drawing   on   the   resources   of   his   own  
linguistic  and  cultural  context.  This   implies   that  he  has   to   find  a  place   in  his  own   language   for  
elements  of  another  language,  hence  creating  an  opening  in  his  own  language  to  be  able  to  phrase  
things   in   a   different  way.17   Ricœur   talked   about   this   as   “the   spirit   of   translation,   consisting   in  
transporting  oneself   into   the   sphere   of  meaning  of   the   foreign   language   and   in  welcoming   the  
other’s  discourse  into  the  sphere  of  the  target  language.”18  
The   fact   that   translation   can   serve   as   a   model   for   enlarging   the   political   community  
comes  from  Ricœur’s  emphasis  on  the  ethical  dimension  of  translation:    
It  seems  to  me  that  translation  poses  not  just  an  intellectual,  theoretical,  or  practical  labor  
but  also  an  ethical  problem.  To  bring  the  reader  to  the  author  and  the  author  to  the  reader,  
at   the   risk   of   serving   two   masters,   is   to   practice   what   I   would   like   to   call   “linguistic  
hospitality.”  It  is  the  model  for  other  forms  of  hospitality  that  I  see  as  akin  to  it.19    
Linguistic  hospitality  highlights  the  ethical  dimension  of  the  desire  to  translate.  It  refers  
to  the  aspiration  of  bringing  together  oneself  and  the  other,  but  with  the  risk  of  betraying  both.  It  
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It   also   refers   to   recognizing   the   impossibility   of   performing   a   perfect   translation.   The   ethics  
involved   is   a   distinct   dimension   of   justice.   It   is   the   realization   of   the   equivalence   between   the  
familiar  and  the  strange,  without  reducing  the  one  to  the  other:  “equivalence  without  identity.”20  
Ricœur  raised  this  ethical  model  of  translation  to  the  status  of  a  paradigm  for  all  rapprochements  
between  people:  “Everywhere  where  there  is  the  foreign,  there  is  a  place  for  the  struggle  against  
non-­‐‑communication.”21  Linguistic  diversity  contributes  to  the  plurality  that  is  so  crucial  to  being  
human.   Linguistic   differences   are   associated   with   different   identities   and,   hence,   with   the  
fragmentation  of  humanity.  Ricœur  emphasized  the  political  implications  of  this  phenomenon:  
Politics  more  than  anything  else  is  affected  by  this  condition  of  plurality.  There  are  states  
because   first   of   all   there   are   distinct   historical   communities   upon   which   their   political  
form  confers  a  capacity  for  decisions.  At  this  highly  conflictual   level,   the  relation  friend-­‐‑
enemy  tends  to  transform  political  diversity  into  unbending  feelings  of  animosity,  owing  
to  claims  for  sovereignty,  a  political  form  of  identity.22    
In   this   regard,   Ricœur   referred   to   the   biblical   story   of   the   Tower   of   Babel,   where   the  
introduction  of  linguistic  differences  led  to  the  dispersion  of  peoples  and,  eventually,  hatred  and  
war.  Brotherhood  was  no  longer  a  given,  but  a  task.  Hence,  for  Ricœur,  the  myth  of  the  Tower  of  
Babel  is  symbolic  of  the  human  condition:  “Like  the  whole  sequence  of  narratives  that  the  Tower  
of   Babel   story   crowns,   the   myth   can   be   read   as   the   pure   and   simple   advent   of   our   factual  
linguistic   condition  :   no   recrimination,  no  deploring,  no   accusation…  Starting   from   this   reality:  
‘Translate!’.”23   Hence,   Ricœur   emphasized   how   the   myth   illustrating   the   setback   of   plurality  
amongst  people  is,  first  and  foremost,  an  appeal  to  realize  harmony.  Translation  is  the  first  step  in  
that   direction   and,   moreover,   it   is   the   model   for   the   entire   enterprise.   In   the   same   way   that  
linguistic   plurality   models   human   plurality   in   general,   the   overcoming   of   the   difficulties   of  
plurality   in   translation   models   every   endeavor   to   overcome   the   problems   of   dispersion   and  
difference:  
Translation   is   from   end   to   end   the   remedy   for   plurality   in   a   world   of   dispersion   and  
confusion.  […]  This  struggle  with  plurality,  its  failures  and  successes,  continues  in  spheres  
more   and   more   distant   from   that   of   work   properly   speaking   applied   to   language   and  
languages.   Translation   functions   as   a   paradigm   by   which   to   expand   the   problematic.  
Humanity,   I  said,  only  exists  as   fragmented.   In   this  regard,  historical  communities,  with  
their  dominant  ethnic,  cultural,  juridical,  political  and  religious  features,  can  be  compared  
to   heterogeneous   linguistic   conglomerations   concerned   to   protect   their   identity   when  
confronted  by  such  diversity.24    
What   this   paradigm   suggests   is   that   different   communities   should   be   considered  
collections  of  meanings,  with  internal  links  and  concepts  that  can  be  transposed  in  the  same  way  
that  a   language  can  be   transposed   into  another   language,  with  all  of   the   same  possibilities  and  
limitations:   “Blocks   of  meaning,   blocks   to   be   translated.”25   This  means   that   in   that   context,  we  
also  have  to  search  for  equivalence  without  identity  and  that  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  
there  is  no  overarching  perspective  that  illuminates  these  relations  once  and  for  all.  It  is  a  step  by  
step   –   “de   proche   en   proche”   –   process   in   which   an   understanding   of   another’s   view   and   an  
enrichment  of  one’s  own  view  is  achieved.  Just  as  we  assume  that  no  language  is  untranslatable  a  
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priori,   we   can   also   assume   that   no   community,   culture   or   outlook   on   life   is   radically   alien.  
Through   hard   work,   we   can   come   closer   and   closer   to   one   another   and   enlarge   the   circle   of  
brotherhood.26  
It  is  important  to  see  that  the  paradigm  of  translation  and  the  idea  of  linguistic  hospitality  
do  not  appear  out  of  nowhere  in  Ricœur’s  work.  Just  like  Emmanuel  Mounier  connected  the  path  
towards   the   universal   unity   of   persons   with   the   identification   of   communication   as   the   basic  
structure  of  personhood,  Ricœur’s  concepts  of  translation  and  linguistic  hospitality  are  essentially  
linked  to  his  anthropology  of  personhood.  The  possibility  of  opening  oneself  to  the  other  and  of  
enriching  oneself  by  experiencing  the  other  are  linked  to  an  interpretation  of  selfhood  that  leaves  
room   for   the   other,   not   only   as   a   stranger,   but   as   a   part   of   oneself.   That   is   the   core   of   the  
anthropology   developed   in   Ricœur’s  Oneself   as   Another.   The   entire   dialectics   of   selfhood   and  
alterity   is   about   this   relationality  whether   it   is   a   question   of   the   ability   to   interpret   oneself   as  
another  and  another  as  oneself  –   the  dialectics  of   sameness  and  selfhood  –  or  a  question  of   the  
constitution  of  personal   identity,   not   only   as   a  matter   of   characteristics   that   stay   the   same,   but  
also   as   a   matter   of   staying   true   to   oneself   because   others   are   counting   on   you.   Hospitality   is  
ingrained   in   a   self   that   is   not   self-­‐‑sufficient.   This   self   can   only   find   itself   by   setting   itself   free  
without  losing  itself  in  the  other.  An  openness  toward  humanity  as  a  whole  puts  into  perspective  
the  notion  of  the  self-­‐‑determination  of  communities,  while  the  possibility  of  working  step  by  step  
towards  unification  closely  resembles  the  relation  between  oneself  and  the  other  on  the  personal  
level.  The  relationship  with  the  other  is  implied  in  the  very  structure  of  personhood,  not  only  as  a  
given,  but  as  a  hopeful  aspiration  as  well.27  
The  Ethics  of  Transnational  Community  Building  
The   concern   for   the   inclusiveness   of   the   political   community   is   an   integral   part   of  
Ricœur’s  conception  of  civic  responsibility.  He  placed  our  political  responsibilities  as  citizens  in  
line  with  our  ethical  responsibilities  as  human  persons.  The  concern  for  just  political  institutions  
is  part  of  the  ethical  aim  of  living  the  good  life  with  and  for  others  in  just  institutions.28  The  fact  
that  a   just  institutional  framework  enables  us  to  develop  ourselves  as  persons  implies  a  duty  to  
preserve  this  framework,  not  only  for  ourselves,  but  also  for  others.29  This  responsibility  does  not  
stop  at   the  borders  of  a  historical  community:  “Justice  adds  […]  to  solicitude,   to   the  extent   that  
the  field  of  application  of  equality  is  all  of  humanity.”30  Eventually,  our  responsibility  concerns  an  
institutional  framework  that  enables  literally  every  human  being  to  develop  herself  as  a  person,  
in  line  with  Emmanuel  Mounier’s  ideal.  In  his  late  hermeneutical  phenomenology  of  personhood,  
Ricœur  considered  this  task  in  the  light  of  the  ethical  dimension  of  translation,  i.e.  the  risky  but  
hopeful   ambition   of   bringing   the   self   and   the   other   closer   together.   This   opened   out   onto   an  
ethics  of   transnational  community  building,   seen  as  an   integral  part  of   the   responsibility  of   the  
person  as  a  citizen.  The  aim  of  this  ethics  of  transnational  community  building  is  clear.  It  is  about  
finding  an   institutional   framework   that  will  allow  every  human  being,  wherever  he  may  be,   to  
fully  flourish  as  a  person.  The  question  remains  how  this  can  be  realized,  or  rather  approximated,  
given   the  utopian  nature  of   the  goal.  Of  course,   the  question  of  how  to   realize   this  goal   in   real  
world  institutions  is  part  of  this  query.  At  this  point  in  history,  no  one  has  a  clear  picture  of  how  
to  organize  a  global  political  community.  The  institutional  problems  of  the  European  Union  show  
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on  this  relatively  modest  level,  all  known  models  of  federalism  fall  short.  When  we  raise  this  to  a  
global   level,   we   are   confronted   with   the   same   problems   only   magnified.   However,   Ricœur  
emphasized   that   even   the  most   ingenious   blueprint   does   not   get   us   very   far   here.   The   perfect  
cosmopolis   on   paper   is   null   and   void   in   practice   if   it   lacks   an   adequate   bottom-­‐‑up   dynamic:  
“Indeed,   it  would  be  a  mistake   to  believe   that   transfers  of   sovereignty   in   support  of   a  political  
entity  which  is  entirely  unrealized  can  be  successful  at  the  formal  level  of  political  and  juridical  
institutions  without  the  will   to   implement  these  transfers  deriving  its   initiative  from  changes  of  
attitude  in  the  ethos  of  individuals,  groups  and  peoples.”31  Given  the  aspiration  of  developing  a  
universal  political  community,  Ricœur  considered  the  realization  of  this  dynamic  to  be  a  part  of  
every   individual’s   civic   responsibility,   and   especially   of   cultural,   academic   and   religious  
communities.  
Ricœur   considered   this   project   of  mentality   integration   to   be   the  pre-­‐‑eminent   locus   for  
the   ethical   paradigm   of   translation.  He   elaborated   this   in   three   steps,   each  with   an   increasing  
degree   of   significance.   The   first   step   pertains   strictly   to   the   sphere   of   translation.  Ricœur   used  
translation  as  a  model  based  on  the  insight  that  that  there  is  no  language,  only  languages,  in  the  
plural.   Human   communication   is  manifested   in   a   variety   of   different   languages,   each  with   its  
own  sounds,  words,  grammar  and  style.  Fortunately,  languages  are  not  closed  systems.  There  is  
always  the  possibility  of  producing  a  translation,  thanks  to  the  skills  of  bilingual  translators  that  
look  for  “optimum  commensurability  between  the  distinctive  resources  of  the  receiving  language  
and   those   of   the   original   language.”   Ricœur   stressed   the   fact   that   this   is   not   only   an   art   of  
transfer,  but  also  an  ethical  matter  of  linguistic  hospitality:  “It  is  really  a  matter  of  living  with  the  
other   in   order   to   take   that   other   to   one’s   home   as   a   guest.”32   On   a   practical   level,   this  
responsibility   is   expressed   in   the   task   of   learning   foreign   languages   and   participating   in   the  
activity  of   translation.  Eventually,   the  hospitality  will   not   so  much   concern   the   language   itself,  
but   the   foreign   culture   that   expresses   itself   by   means   of   the   language   in   question.   Hence,  
translators  have  an  important  role  to  play  in  the  transfer  of  meaning,  ranging  from  the  meaning  
of   customs   and   beliefs   to   that   of   social   principles.   Being   sensitive   towards   another   language  
makes  it  easier  to  be  sensitive  towards  other  cultures  and  other  ways  of  thinking  and  acting.  In  
this   way,   linguistic   hospitality   fosters   the   ethical   impulse   for   more   sympathetic   political  
interaction  between  persons  and  for  political  integration.33  
The   second   step   follows   from   the   preceding   step.   What   is   exchanged   by   means   of  
translation   is,   to  a   large  extent,   a  matter  of  distinct  memories   that  are   linked   to  a   community’s  
identity.   Hence,   the   second   step   concerns   the   exchange   of   memories.   Given   the   narrative  
conception  of  identity,  different  identities  come  to  the  fore  in  different  stories.  These  stories  can  
always  be  revised.  Moreover,  the  stories  that  compose  a  community’s  identity  are  always  linked  
to  the  stories  of  others.  This  brings  a  different  dimension  of  hospitality  to  the  surface:    
What  we  are   supposed   to  break  here   is   the  principle  of   closure   that  always   threatens   to  
contaminate  what  I  have  called  narrative  identity.  It  is  important  to  always  remember  that  
we  are  entangled  in  the  story  of  others,  in  plural  stories,  told  by  others  about  themselves  
and  by  others   about  us.   That   is  where   the   task   of   exchanging  memories   has   its   origins.  
This   task   consists   in   assuming   the   history   of   others   in   imagination   and   in   sympathy  
through   the   life   stories   that   concern   them.   This   demand   goes   a   long  way,   it   asks   us   to  
learn  to  narrate  ourselves  differently  through  the  stories  that  others  tell  about  us.34    
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By   enriching   the   stories   of   one’s   own   community,   the   stories   of   others’   linguistic  
hospitality   become   narrative   hospitality.   The   primary   step,   then,   is   to   resist   the   temptation   to  
consider  the  identity  of  one’s  own  political  community  as  a  given.  In  this  regard,  Ricœur  referred  
to   the   specific   role   of   community   founding   events,   such   as   the   French   Revolution,   in   his   own  
case.   The   task   is   to   learn   to   read   these   historic   events   in   a   pluralistic  way,   by   introducing   the  
perspective  of  minorities  and  other  communities.  That  is  the  way  to  keep  traditions  alive  and  to  
open  up  new  meanings  that  can  bring  people  and  communities  closer  together.35  
  
The   third   step  of   the   integration  process   again   follows   from   the  preceding.  The   shared  
recollection  of  memories  is  usually  painful.  In  this  process,  we  inevitably  encounter,  what  Ricœur  
described   as,   “the   broken   promises   of   history.”   This   points   to   the   fact   that   throughout   history  
every   community   has   confronted   suffering,   both   in   the   sense   that   its   members   have   endured  
suffering   and   in   the   sense   that   they   have   caused   suffering   to   others.   The   aim   of   narrative  
hospitality   in   this   respect   is   to   start   from  the  suffering  of  others.  At   this  point,   the  exchange  of  
memories  shifts  into  the  domain  of  forgiving:    
This  exchange  demands  more  than  the  imagination  and  sympathy  which  were  called  for  
above.  This  “extra”  has  something  to  do  with  forgiveness  insofar  as  forgiveness  consists  in  
“shattering   the   debt”   […].   Its   “poetic”   power   consists   in   shattering   the   law   of   the  
irreversibility  of  time  by  changing  the  past,  not  as  a  record  of  all  that  has  happened  but  in  
terms   of   its   meaning   for   us   today.   It   does   this   by   lifting   the   burden   of   guilt   which  
paralyses   the   relations   between   individuals  who   are   acting   out   and   suffering   their   own  
history.  It  does  not  abolish  the  debt  insofar  as  we  are  and  remain  the  inheritors  of  the  past,  
but  it  lifts  the  pain  of  the  debt.36    
Hence,   the  enlargement  of  political  brotherhood  requires  a  radical  step,  not  so  much  to  
offer   to   forgive   the   other   from   a   superior   position,   but   primarily   to   ask   for   forgiveness   in  
humility.  Here,   Ricœur   seems   to   have   left   the   domain   of   politics.  However,   he   framed   this   in  
terms  of  the  dialectics  of  love  and  justice,  which  indicate  that  the  striving  for  justice  occasionally  
requires   input   from  the   logic  of   the  gift,   rather   than  the  strict   logic  of  reciprocity.  Moreover,  he  
referred   to   historical   examples   that  make   the   theory  more   tangible,   such   as   the   prostration   of  
German   chancellor  Willy   Brandt   in  Auschwitz   or   the   speech   of   Egyptian   president  Anwar   al-­‐‑
Sadat  before  the  Knesset.37  
Conclusion  
The  final,  formal  goal  of  the  course  of  community  building  that  Ricœur  outlined  was  not  
unambiguous.  However,   there   is  no  doubt   that   from  a  very  early  stage,  Ricœur  was  convinced  
that  the  nation-­‐‑state  was  a  largely  outdated  concept.  In  both  moral  theological  and  philosophical  
essays,   he   underlined   how   the   paradigm   of   the   nation-­‐‑state   clashes   with   the   global   scale   of  
economy,   science  and   technology.  This   led  him   to   stress   the  need   to  work   towards  a  universal  
cultural  and  political  understanding.38  However,  he  expressed  serious  reservations  with  regard  to  
the   idea   of   a  world-­‐‑state.   Referring   to   the   criticism   of   Éric  Weil,   he   deemed   the   dimension   of  
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Therefore,   he   argued   that   the   idea  was   both   necessary   and   basically   unfeasible   in   the   nuclear  
era.39  He  spoke  more  concretely  about  the  construction  of  institutions  that  take  up  the  same  role  
among  states  as  states  do  with  regard  to  its  own  citizens.  He  insisted,  however,  that  this  cannot  
be  a  super-­‐‑state:    
Like  states  have  withdrawn  the  exercise  of  violence  from  their  citizens,  we  are  looking  for  
new  political  institutions  that  could  do  with  regard  to  states  what  each  state  has  done  with  
regard  to  its  own  members.  The  solution  is  not  to  create  a  super-­‐‑state,  but  a  new  kind  of  
institution  that,  in  some  way,  marks  the  death  of  the  state.40    
Although   Ricœur   was   skeptical   regarding   the   utopian   nature   of   a   world-­‐‑state,   he  
considered  the  cosmopolitan  idea  to  be  the  vague  horizon  of  a  striving  for  integration.  Thus,  his  
focus  was  more  on  the  course  than  on  the  final  destination.  
The   transnational   dimension   of   Ricœur’s   conception   of   civic   responsibilities   picked   up  
and   further   developed   Mounier’s   personalist   and   communitarian   ideal.   Ricœur   reiterated  
Mounier’s  plea  for  a  bottom-­‐‑up,  gradual  enlargement  and  deepening  of  the  will  to  live  together.  
Like  Mounier,  he  based  this  plea  on  the  radical  relationality  of  the  self  and  the  other.  However,  
where  Mounier   talked  about   communication  as   a   structure  of  personhood   that   summons  us   to  
approach   the  other,  Ricœur’s   reflections  on   translation  provided   the  missing   link.  Mounier  had  
been  forced  to  admit  that  his  five  step  course  towards  unification  on  the  basis  of  communication  
was  doomed  to  failure.  He  had  discovered  structural  impediments  in  an  ineffable  residue  found  
in  alterity,  in  the  opacity  of  our  own  existence  and  in  a  general  inclination  towards  isolation.41  All  
that  was   left  was  what  Ricœur   called  Mounier’s   “tragic  optimism.”42  Ricœur  himself,  however,  
identified  what   it   is   that   justifies   this   optimism,   by   referring  not   just   to   the  human   capacity   to  
communicate,  but  more  specifically  to  our  capacity  to  translate.  What  enables  us,  despite  all  the  
strangeness  we  encounter,  to  enlarge  the  circle  of  brotherhood  is  the  capacity  to  gradually  settle  
in  the  world  of  the  other  and  to  welcome  the  other  into  one’s  own  world.  Ricœur  recognized  the  
importance  of  community,  but  he  tied  this  to  a  striving  for  inclusiveness.  That  is  what  his  three-­‐‑
step   ethics   of   transnational   community   building   is  meant   for,   in   the   sense   of   a   non-­‐‑exhaustive  
guideline.  Moreover,  his   ethics  of   translation  clarified   the   idea   that   the  aim   is  not   to   come   to  a  
total   fusion,   but   rather   to   a   will   to   live   together   as   equals.   The   relevant   ideal   is   not   fusional  
cosmopolitan  brotherhood,  but  “equivalence  without  identity,”43  or  “a  just  distance.”44  
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